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ESSAY
THE UNEXONERATED: FACTUALLY INNOCENT
DEFENDANTS WHO PLEAD GUILTY
John H. Blume† & Rebecca K. Helm††
Several recent high profile cases, including the case of the West Mem-
phis Three, have revealed (again) that factually innocent defendants do
plead guilty.  And, more disturbingly, in many of the cases, the defendant’s
innocence is known, or at least highly suspected, at the time the plea is en-
tered.  Innocent defendants plead guilty most often, but not always, in three
sets of cases: first, low level offenses where a quick guilty plea provides the key
to the cellblock door; second, cases where defendants have been wrongfully
convicted, prevail on appeal, and are then offered a plea bargain that will
assure their immediate or imminent release; and third, where defendants are
threatened with harsh alternative punishments if they do not plead guilty.
There are three primary contributing factors leading to a criminal justice
system where significant numbers of innocent defendants plead guilty to
crimes they did not commit.  The first is the perceived need that all defend-
ants must plead.  The second is the current draconian sentencing regime for
criminal offenses.  And, the final contributing factor is that plea bargaining
is, for the most part, an unregulated industry.  This Essay discusses cases in
which innocent defendants pled guilty to obtain their release—thus joining
the “unexonerated”; explores the factors that “cause” innocent defendants to
plead guilty; and finally proposes several options the criminal justice system
could embrace to avoid, or at least ameliorate, the plight of innocent defend-
ants who plead guilty.
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INTRODUCTION
“It’s a total injustice . . . .  These three men are being made to plead
guilty to something they didn’t do . . . .”
John Mark Byers, father of one of the
alleged West Memphis Three victims1
On August 19, 2011, Damien Echols, Jason Baldwin, and Jessie
Misskelley, also known as the “West Memphis Three,” were released
from prison nearly eighteen years after they were first arrested in con-
nection with the murders of three eight-year-old boys in West Mem-
phis, Arkansas.2  Their freedom came at a significant cost however; to
obtain their release they pled guilty to crimes they almost certainly did
not commit.3  The deal offered by prosecutors was too “good” to turn
down.  We might like to think that such things do not happen, or if
they do, only very rarely, but innocent defendants do plead guilty
more often than most people think and certainly more often than
anyone cares to admit.  In this Essay, we will discuss several cases in
which this has occurred, the reasons why innocent defendants plead
guilty, and finally, offer some tentative proposals to reduce the num-
ber of instances in which this happens.
Let us begin with a more detailed discussion of the West Mem-
phis Three case to set the stage.  The defendants were arrested in
1993 after the bodies of three young boys—Christopher Byers, Stevie
Branch, and Michael Moore—were found naked and hogtied with
their own shoelaces.4  The victims’ clothing was found in a nearby
1 Jijo Jacob, West Memphis Three Walk to Freedom: Are They Really Innocent?, INT’L BUS.
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2011, 7:09 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/west-memphis-three-walk-free
dom-are-they-really-innocent-302261 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/us/20arkansas.html.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 19–28.
4 Who Are the West Memphis Three?, ARK. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.arktimes
.com/arkansas/who-are-the-west-memphis-three/Content?oid=1886216.
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creek.5  Byers had deep lacerations and injuries to his scrotum and
penis.6  An autopsy revealed that Byers died from multiple injuries,7
and the other two boys from multiple injuries with drowning.8  Miss-
kelley confessed to the murders following a twelve-hour police interro-
gation and implicated Echols and Baldwin in his confession.9
Misskelley later recanted but was convicted in February 1994 on the
strength of his confession and sentenced to life imprisonment plus
two twenty-year sentences.10  The prosecution’s case against Misskelley
was based almost entirely on his confession.  In fact, without the state-
ments, the prosecution’s case could not have survived a directed ver-
dict motion.11
Echols and Baldwin were convicted of three counts of capital
murder.  The convictions were largely based on prosecution evidence
that the defendants had been motivated as members of a satanic cult
and witnesses who said they had heard the teenagers speak of the
murders.12  Echols was sentenced to death and Baldwin received a
sentence of life imprisonment.13
In 2007, new evidence came to light.  DNA testing revealed that
biological material found at the crime scene did not belong to the
victims or the three convicted defendants.14  However, a hair found in
one of the knots on one of the hogtied bodies was determined to be
“not inconsistent” with a DNA sample obtained from the stepfather of
5 Jacob, supra note 1.
6 FRANK J. PERETTI & WILLIAM Q. STURNER, ARK. STATE CRIME LAB., CHRISTOPHER
BYERS AUTOPSY REPORT 4 (1993), available at http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Other/
west%20memphis%20three/byers,%20christopher.pdf.
7 Id. at 9.
8 FRANK J. PERETTI & WILLIAM Q. STURNER, ARK. STATE CRIME LAB., STEVE E. BRANCH
AUTOPSY REPORT 8 (1993), available at http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Other/west%
20memphis%20three/branch,%20steve.pdf; FRANK J. PERETTI & WILLIAM Q. STURNER, ARK.
STATE CRIME LAB., MICHAEL MOORE AUTOPSY REPORT 8 (1993), available at http://www.au
topsyfiles.org/reports/Other/west%20memphis%20three/moore,%20james%20michael
%20.pdf.
9 Who Are the West Memphis Three?, supra note 4. R
10 Id.; Youth Is Convicted in Slaying of 3 Boys in an Arkansas City, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/05/us/youth-is-convicted-in-slaying-of-3-boys-in-
an-arkansas-city.html.
11 See Misskelley v. State, 915 S.W.2d 702, 707 (Ark. 1996) (“The statements [of con-
fession made by Misskelley] were the strongest evidence offered against the appellant at
trial.  In fact, they were virtually the only evidence, all other testimony and exhibits serving
primarily as corroboration.”).
12 Robertson, supra note 2. R
13 Who Are the West Memphis Three?, supra note 4. R
14 See Shaila Dewan, Defense Offers New Evidence in a Murder Case that Shocked Arkansas,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/30/us/30satanic.html
(“[A]ccording to long-awaited new evidence filed by the defense in federal court on Mon-
day . . . at least one person other than the defendants may have been present at the crime
scene.”).  In fact, no physical evidence had ever been discovered linking the three alleged
perpetrators to the crime. Id.
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one of the victims.15  Evidence of juror misconduct involving the
foreperson of the jury was discovered,16 and a witness who allegedly
told police she had seen the defendants in the area where the crime
occurred recanted her testimony.17
On November 4, 2010, the Arkansas Supreme Court ordered a
state trial judge to determine whether the new DNA evidence ren-
dered the convictions invalid.18  However, before the hearing took
place, the prosecution offered the West Memphis Three a “get out of
jail” (but not free) opportunity.  Although they would have to plead
guilty to lesser charges, the three men would not have to admit their
guilt; they would be permitted to plead guilty while still maintaining
their innocence using what is commonly called an Alford plea.19  The
agreed-upon sentence would be time served, thus each defendant
would be released immediately from prison after entering the pleas.
But it was a “package” deal, and was null and void unless all three
defendants said yes.20  After some hesitation, all three defendants ac-
cepted the bargain, entered the pleas, and were released.21
Was justice served?  The plea bargain did secure the defendants’
freedom after eighteen years of confinement.  It also ensured that
Echols would not be executed.  Almost any criminal defense lawyer,
including the authors of this Essay, would have advised them to take it
(and would have cajoled them to take it if they hesitated).  However,
their freedom came at a high price; the three men pled guilty to a
murder they adamantly maintained they did not commit, which the
overwhelming weight of the evidence suggested they did not commit,
and which almost no one in the community where the crime occurred
believed they committed.  Furthermore, because a plea is a convic-
tion, the three men are now all “convicted murderers.”  This will con-
tinue to have significant effects on their ability to find employment,22
and furthermore, they are deprived of most of their civil rights and of
any civil remedy they possibly had against either the police or prosecu-
15 Amrutha Gayathri, Damien Echols of ‘West Memphis 3’ Accuses Victim’s Stepfather of
Triple Murder, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012, 5:31 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/damien-
echols-west-memphis-3-accuses-victims-stepfather-triple-murder-399102.
16 Robertson, supra note 2 (“[R]ecently a former lawyer for [Mr. Misskelley’s] jury’s R
foreman filed an affidavit saying that the foreman, determined to convict, had brought the
confession up in deliberations to sway undecided jurors.”).
17 Tim Hackler, Complete Fabrication, ARK. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2004), http://www.arktimes
.com/arkansas/completefabrication/Content?oid=1886107.
18 Echols v. State, 373 S.W.3d 892, 902 (Ark. 2010).
19 Robertson, supra note 2. R
20 David Koon, Jason’s Choice: Friendship, Freedom and a Principled Stand, ARK. TIMES
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/jasons-choice/Content?oid=1888400.
21 Id.; Robertson, supra note 2. R
22 JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH, EX-
OFFENDERS AND THE LABOR MARKET 8 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/
publications/ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf.
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tors,23 leaving them without any compensation for the eighteen years
of wrongful imprisonment.
The prosecution’s plea offer was (and was designed to be) highly
coercive.  The chances that any one of the three would have been
found guilty at a new trial were slim; the prosecutors admitted as
much.24  But the prospect of immediate release from prison made
“rolling the dice” at a new trial (assuming the judge ordered one) a
risky proposition, and one not many persons imprisoned for nearly
two decades would be likely to take, or one any competent attorney
would advise them to take.  Adding to the coercion was the condition
that if any of the three rejected the offer, the other two could not take
advantage of the deal.  This put great pressure on Misskelley and Bald-
win to accept the plea for their friend’s sake; Echols was still on death
row and faced the possibility of execution.25  In fact, press accounts
revealed that Baldwin did not want to plead guilty and would have
preferred to take his chances before a new jury.  “This was not justice,”
he said immediately following the plea.  “However, they’re trying to
kill Damien.  Sometimes you’ve just got to bite down to save some-
body.”26  Echols later thanked Baldwin at a press conference for his
decision to accept the plea despite his misgivings.27
The “deal” in this case almost certainly resulted in three innocent
men pleading guilty to something they did not do.  They were offered
a deal they could not realistically refuse.  They now stand “convicted”
of the murders of three young boys.  Should such a result be toler-
ated?  Should prosecutors be allowed to coerce factually innocent de-
fendants to plead guilty to crimes they did not commit?  It is a
question worth asking because although the West Memphis Three
case was unusual in terms of the publicity it attracted, this type of case
is not unusual.  Innocent defendants plead guilty quite frequently—
one of many dark secrets of the criminal justice system.28
As we will discuss below, the modern American criminal justice
system has three features that create the hydraulic pressure that in-
creases the risk of innocent defendants pleading guilty: (1) the sys-
tem’s need (or at least perceived need) for the overwhelming majority
23 See infra notes 108, 114 and accompanying text. R
24 See Max Brantley, Prosecutor’s Statement on West Memphis 3 Plea Deal, ARK. TIMES (Aug.
19, 2011, 12:11 PM), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2011/08/19/
prosecutors-statement-on-west-memphis-3-plea-deal (noting prosecutor Scott Ellington’s
statement that “it would be practically impossible to put on a proper case against the de-
fendants in this particular case after eighteen years of extended litigation”).
25 Koon, supra note 20. R
26 Id.; Robertson, supra note 2. R
27 “West Memphis Three”: Damien Echols Overwhelmed by Release, CBS NEWS (Aug. 19,
2011, 4:14 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/west-memphis-three-damien-echols-over
whelmed-by-release/.
28 See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. R
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of defendants to plead guilty; (2) draconian sentences for many of-
fenses and offenders; and (3) an almost complete lack of judicial reg-
ulation of the plea bargaining process.  These three factors combine
to create a system in which innocent defendants can be coerced to
plead guilty.
I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
We next provide a brief overview of the history of plea bargain-
ing, a subject which (many) books have been written about.29
Plea bargaining first became common in the United States in the
mid-1800s,30 and by 1967 the American Bar Association was beginning
to embrace the practice, noting that it was necessary given the system’s
lack of resources.31  The constitutionality of the practice, however, was
not firmly established until 1970.32  Negotiated pleas became the pri-
mary means of disposition of criminal cases as crime rates rose in the
late 1960s and early 1970s and as the number of state and federal
criminal prosecutions proliferated in response to public demand for
29 See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BAR-
GAINING IN AMERICA (2003) (examining the rise of plea bargaining in the United States);
MIKE MCCONVILLE & CHESTER L. MIRSKY, JURY TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING: A TRUE HIS-
TORY (2005) (studying the origin and adoption of plea bargaining in place of jury trials);
MARY E. VOGEL, COERCION TO COMPROMISE: PLEA BARGAINING, THE COURTS AND THE MAKING
OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY (2007) (analyzing the context in which plea bargaining
developed).
30 JENIA I. TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 9 (Hiram
E. Chodosh ed., 2009).
31 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2 (1967) (“[A] high proportion of pleas of
guilty and nolo contendere does benefit the system.  Such pleas tend to limit the trial process
to deciding real disputes and, consequently, to reduce the need for funds and
personnel.”).
32 Robert Brady was indicted in 1959 for kidnapping and failing to release a hostage
without harm, which carried a maximum penalty of death.  But, he could only be sen-
tenced to death if: (a) he went to trial; (b) he was convicted; and (c) the jury recom-
mended death as the appropriate punishment.  Brady chose to plead guilty to avoid the
risk of capital punishment, and he was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment, later reduced
to thirty.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 743–44 (1970).  Eight years later, Brady
challenged the constitutionality of his guilty plea based on the Supreme Court’s interven-
ing decision in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), which held that the statutory
scheme authorizing the death penalty only for those who went to trial had the “inevitable
effect . . . to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to
deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial.” Brady, 397 U.S. at
746.  Brady argued that his plea was invalid because it was induced by the threat of death.
The Court, however, held that Brady’s plea was knowing and intelligent at the time it was
entered; he understood the risks and obtained the benefit of the bargain. Id. at 748,
756–57.  Furthermore, the Court determined that the criminal justice system would be
robbed of its flexibility if intervening decisions upset pleas previously entered. Id. at
746–47.
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action.33  For example, the number of felony prosecutions (and the
number of prison inmates) more than doubled between 1978 and
1991.34  The increase in the number of cases was not accompanied by
sufficient additional resources to handle them—for example, addi-
tional prosecutors.35  Thus, it quickly became generally accepted that
the system could only process the growing backlog of cases by reduc-
ing the number of trials.  To reduce trials, it was essential that more
defendants plead guilty.36  And, they did.
Today plea bargaining is accepted as an essential and permanent
component of the American criminal justice system.  Between 2008
and 2012 more than 96% of all resolved criminal cases culminated in
plea bargains rather than trial.37  In 2012, 97% of cases that were re-
solved were settled through pleas, with only 3% being adjudicated in
bench or jury trials.38  As Justice Anthony Kennedy recently observed:
“the reality [is] that criminal justice today is for the most part a system
of pleas, not a system of trials.”39  And the view of pleas has changed.
Once thought to be a “necessary evil,”40 plea bargaining is now ap-
plauded as an efficient means of disposition.  Two terms ago in a dif-
ferent case, Justice Kennedy, again speaking for a majority of the
Court, stated: “To note the prevalence of plea bargaining is not to
criticize it.  The potential to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources
and for defendants to admit their crimes and receive more favorable
terms at sentencing means that a plea agreement can benefit both
parties.”41
33 William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule
of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 376 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
34 Id. at 375.
35 For example, from 1974 to 1990, almost the same period in which caseloads
doubled, the number of assistant prosecutors nationwide rose less than 20%, from 17,000
to 20,000. JOHN M. DAWSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1990,
at 2 (1992), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc90.pdf.
36 Stuntz, supra note 33, at 363–64. R
37 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENC-
ING STATISTICS fig.C (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2012/FigureC.pdf.
38 Id.
39 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
40 Id. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[U]ntil today [plea bargaining] has been re-
garded as a necessary evil.  It presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effec-
tively compels an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser
offense; and for guilty defendants it often—perhaps usually—results in a sentence well
below what the law prescribes for the actual crime.  But even so, we accept plea bargaining
because many believe that without it our long and expensive process of criminal trial could
not sustain the burden imposed on it, and our system of criminal justice would grind to a
halt.”).
41 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
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A. The System’s Need for Defendants to Plead Guilty
The current conventional wisdom is that without the ability to
dispose of the vast majority of cases through plea bargaining, the crim-
inal justice system would collapse inwardly upon itself like a legal
black hole.  More than forty years ago, then chief justice Warren Bur-
ger stated that “[a] reduction from 90 per cent to 80 per cent in guilty
pleas requires the assignment of twice the judicial manpower and fa-
cilities” and “[a] reduction to 70 per cent trebles this demand.”42  Re-
gardless of whether the former chief justice’s resource allocation
assessments are accurate, it is almost universally accepted by the par-
ticipants in the system that there is not enough personnel, court time,
or funds to try every case, or for that matter even any significant per-
centage of cases.43  In Santobello v. New York the Supreme Court con-
cluded that plea bargaining was “an essential component of the
administration of justice. . . .  If every criminal charge were subjected
to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need
to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”44
Thus while some critics question the fairness and integrity of a system
that must forego trials to survive, the practice is not going away.45
Quite the contrary; as noted by the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Frye,
“[i]n today’s criminal justice system, . . . the negotiation of a plea bar-
gain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical
point for a defendant.”46
B. Draconian Sentences for Many Offenses and Offenders
Assuming that it is correct and desirable (or at least necessary)
that most defendants plead guilty, the most effective way for the prose-
cution to induce pleas is to offer incentives to defendants to waive
their right to trial.  However, the rise in crime rates described above
was accompanied by a political demand to “get tough” on crime.47
42 Warren Burger, The State of the Judiciary—1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970).
43 See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (“Whatever might be the
situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea
bargain are important components of this country’s criminal justice system.  Properly ad-
ministered, they can benefit all concerned.”); F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani,
Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and
the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 227 (2002) (noting that even if plea bargaining was re-
duced by a mere ten percent, the requirement for judicial manpower and resources would
more than double).
44 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
45 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL
QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at tbls.22 & 42 (2013), available at http://www
.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/
quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC_2013_Quarter_Report_Final.pdf (showing that for fis-
cal year 2013, 96.9% of criminal cases were resolved by plea rather than by trial).
46 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
47 Stuntz, supra note 33, at 375. R
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Thus during the same period, minimum and maximum sentences also
rose sharply, as did the enactment of a variety of recidivist statutes.48
Furthermore, in the same era, legal definitions of criminal intent and
liability were also expanded—making it easier to convict defendants
of more serious crimes.49  Given the new weapons in their inducement
arsenal, prosecutors began to “encourage” guilty pleas by threatening
harsher punishments.50  As legislatures added new crimes and in-
creased sentences, a “menu” was created giving a charging list of sen-
tencing options to prosecutors to extract bargains.51  This created a
plea bargaining system whereby extremely coercive “deals” were of-
fered to defendants both in terms of incentives to forego trial and
avoidance of much harsher punishment.
C. Lack of Judicial Regulation of the Plea Bargaining Process
The system can operate in such a coercive manner because plea
bargaining is, for the most part, an unregulated “industry.”  It is true
that there are some statutes and rules that provide guidelines and lim-
its on plea bargaining.52  In federal cases, for example, the judge who
accepts the plea must be satisfied that there is “a factual basis” for it,
advise the defendant whether the court is bound by the parties’ rec-
ommendations, decide whether to accept or reject the plea agree-
ment, and ensure the proceedings are captured in a verbatim record
to facilitate review.53  However, judicial focus for the most part is on
whether the plea was knowing and intelligent.54  The determination
of whether the plea agreement is truly voluntary does not depend on
the substantive terms or generosity of the bargain.55  Because a plea is
only involuntary when it is the result of “force, threats, or promises”
48 Id. at 377.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See Stuntz, infra note 60; Stuntz, infra note 73. R
52 For examples of federal and state criminal rules of procedure governing plea bar-
gaining, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11(f).
53 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
54 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of constitutional
rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”).
55 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“Indeed, acceptance of the
basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty
plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of the bar-
gaining process.  By hypothesis, the plea may have been induced by promises of a recom-
mendation of a lenient sentence or a reduction of charges, and thus by fear of the
possibility of a greater penalty upon conviction after a trial.”).
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extraneous to the agreement itself,56 prosecutors have wide latitude in
setting the terms of plea arrangements.57
D. Debate Regarding the Current System and Conviction of
Innocent Defendants
This system, including its desirability and morality, have been and
continue to be debated in the academy and by judges and practicing
lawyers.  The academic literature is varied in its reaction to plea bar-
gaining and consists primarily of both attempts to provide a theoreti-
cal justification for plea bargaining58 and critiques of the current plea
bargaining process.59  Some object to the new reality of plea bargain-
ing on the basis that it allows prosecutors to “cut corners”; often pits
56 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
57 For example, in Brady, the Court held that the threat of the death penalty could be
used to induce a guilty plea as long as the plea was knowing and intelligent.  397 U.S. at
747–48.  Furthermore, a large differential between the sentence a defendant would face
after trial and the sentence he receives under the terms of the plea agreement does not
render the agreement involuntary. See Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364–65 (effectively rejecting the
suggestion that prosecutors cannot threaten a lengthy and serious criminal punishment
that has not been applied, at least occasionally, to similarly situated defendants—meaning
that a charge that would not have been brought originally could be threatened if a guilty
plea was rejected).  Justice Lewis Powell was critical of this in his dissent in Hayes. See infra
text accompanying note 155.
58 See, e.g., Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice,” 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
509, 511–12 (1979) (defending the rationality of the plea bargaining system against crit-
ics); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289,
308–09 (1983) (arguing that plea bargaining is desirable as a mechanism for setting the
price of crime); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969,
1975 (1992) (defending plea bargaining by noting that it operates as a “black market” that
allows defendants to bargain for the best deal); Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining,
58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 603–06 (2005) (arguing that plea bargaining is valuable because it
maximizes deserved punishment at a reasonable cost); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1950–51 (1992) (setting forth a contract
theory of plea bargaining and urging structural modifications to account for innocent
defendants).
59 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alter-
natives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932 (1983) (“Plea bargaining
makes a substantial part of an offender’s sentence depend, not upon what he did or his
personal characteristics, but upon a tactical decision irrelevant to any proper objective of
criminal proceedings.  In contested cases, it substitutes a regime of split-the-difference for
a judicial determination of guilt or innocence and elevates a concept of partial guilt above
the requirement that criminal responsibility be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
This practice also deprecates the value of human liberty and the purposes of the criminal
sanction by treating these things as commodities to be traded for economic savings—sav-
ings that, when measured against common social expenditures, usually seem minor.”);
Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Em-
pirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (2013)
(discussing a study involving students in which more than half of the innocent participants
were willing to falsely admit guilt for a benefit); Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of
Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1370–71,
1394–97 (2000) (contending that plea bargaining unfairly punishes virtually everyone who
insists upon trial); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979,
1998 (1992) (challenging the contract defense of plea bargaining); Katherine J.
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lawyers against their clients, thus eroding the attorney-client relation-
ship; diminishes community participation in the criminal justice sys-
tem; and places too much (coercive) power in the hands of
prosecutors rather than neutral judges.60  Proponents of plea bargain-
ing counter that it promotes efficiency and autonomy; it is essential,
according to plea-bargaining defenders, that criminal cases be re-
solved without trials.61  Defenders also maintain that despite the po-
tentially coercive power placed in prosecutor’s hands, even an
innocent defendant is better off when she chooses to plead guilty in
order to assure a more lenient result if she concludes that there is a
risk of wrongful conviction at trial.62  By allowing a defendant to
choose whether to accept a plea bargain or take her chances at trial,
the rational defendant (so the theory goes) will only choose to plead
guilty if the chances of being found guilty are high (or process costs
are high compared to the costs of a guilty plea).  Therefore, according
to this school of thought, even innocent defendants gain from plea
bargaining.  A further advantage of the plea-bargaining system is said
to be respect for an individual’s autonomy in that it gives the defen-
dant some ability to control her destiny.63
Relying on the consensual nature of the practice, the Supreme
Court, as noted above, has praised plea bargaining as benefiting all
participants in the criminal justice system as well as the public.64  The
Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1321, 1336–38
(2003) (suggesting that the use of plea bargaining may in fact decrease deterrence).
60 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464, 2476 (2004) (noting a lack of “checks” on prosecutors in the plea bargaining process
thereby allowing them to “minimize effort”); infra note 182; see also Albert W. Alschuler, R
Personal Failure, Institutional Failure, and the Sixth Amendment, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 149–53 (1986) (noting that the plea bargaining system subjects defense attorneys
to temptations to disregard their clients’ interests, for example through incentives to main-
tain a good relationship with prosecutors); Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The
Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 84 (2005) (noting how plea
bargaining has given prosecutors more power rather than judges); William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2549 (2004)
(describing the criminal law as a “menu” of options that prosecutors can use to dictate the
terms of plea bargains).
61 See supra text accompanying notes 43–44. R
62 See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1158–59 (2008)
(noting that it may be unjust to force an innocent defendant to face the uncertainty of a
trial).
63 Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment,
Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 685 (1975) (arguing that the rules
governing plea bargaining “are rooted in a basic commitment . . . to respect human dignity
by protecting the right of every adult to determine what he shall do and what may be done
to him”).
64 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260–61 (1971) (“Disposition of charges after
plea discussions . . . leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it
avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for
those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused per-
sons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by
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Court has focused on the supposed benefits, even in cases where there
is strong evidence of vindictive treatment and coercive tactics.  For ex-
ample, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, Justice Potter Stewart’s majority opin-
ion defended the practice against a challenge based on the
prosecutor’s decision to increase the charges with “unique severity”
against a defendant who refused to plead guilty.65  Hayes was indicted
for uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30.  The prose-
cutor offered Hayes a term of five years imprisonment in exchange for
a guilty plea.66  Hayes, believing five years was excessive given the
modest amount of funds illegally obtained, turned it down.  Because
Hayes had two prior felony convictions for similar offenses, the prose-
cutor then indicted Hayes, as he had promised he would, under the
Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act.  Hayes was convicted and sentenced
to the mandatory term of life imprisonment with the possibility of pa-
role.67  Hayes argued that the prosecutor’s actions were vindictive and
thus violated the Due Process Clause.  The Supreme Court rejected
Hayes’s due process challenge, even though the prosecutor conceded
that he charged Hayes as a habitual criminal for the purpose of induc-
ing a plea.68  Despite previous decisions establishing that state prac-
tices designed to discourage the assertion of constitutional rights,
including the right to jury trial, are “patently unconstitutional,”69 the
Court determined that because the prosecutor could have legitimately
charged Hayes under the Habitual Criminal Act initially, it was not
vindictive (in the constitutional sense) to use the Act to induce the
plea after Hayes rejected the initial offer.70  Justice Stewart’s majority
opinion also hailed the virtues of plea bargaining—“[p]roperly ad-
ministered, [pleas] can benefit all concerned”—and described plea
bargaining as “give-and-take” negotiations between sides with rela-
tively equal bargaining power.71  Emphasizing mutual advantage, with
both sides gaining by agreements to persuade defendants to plead to
lesser charges, the Court stated that it is completely legitimate for a
prosecutor to induce pleas “by promises of a recommendation of a
shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the
rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.”).
65 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978).  Justice Powell described the charges as being of
“unique severity.” Id. at 373 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 358 (majority opinion).
67 Id. at 358–59.
68 Id. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting).
69 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (holding “patently unconstitu-
tional” a provision of a statute that would subject defendants to the death penalty only if
they choose to proceed to trial).
70 Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364–65.
71 Id. at 362 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
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lenient sentence or a reduction of charges, and thus by fear of the
possibility of a greater penalty upon conviction after a trial.”72
But saying it is so, even if it is the Supreme Court that says it, does
not make it so.  In many cases, there is no true mutuality of advantage
or true free choice for defendants given the highly coercive nature of
the practice.  As others have noted, Hayes allows a prosecutor to apply
leverage by filing charges that would not have been brought against
the defendant absent plea bargaining considerations and that no one,
including the prosecutor that levies them, believes are appropriate.73
Superficially, the defendant appears to receive a benefit if the prose-
cutor agrees to dismiss the added charges in exchange for a guilty
plea, but the benefit is, in reality, illusory.  Innocent defendants, even
those who are unlikely to be found guilty at trial, are pleading guilty.74
The lack of advantage to many innocent defendants is exacer-
bated by the fact that prosecutors often offer the strongest incentives
to defendants in cases where the evidence is weakest; it is necessary to
do so to secure a conviction.75  Here, the mutuality-of-advantage argu-
ment does not work because prosecutors can extract a guilty plea in
almost any case, regardless of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, by
dramatically changing the cost-benefit analysis.76  Rarely will a defen-
72 Id. at 363.
73 See Stephen F. Ross, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Ignoring Prosecutorial Abuses in Plea
Bargaining, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 875, 879–80 (1978) (“Hayes removes the plea bargaining pro-
cess from the ‘mutuality of advantage’ model and legitimizes coercing defendants to waive
their constitutionally protected right to trial.”); see also Stuntz, supra note 60, at 2548 R
(“Criminal law is different.  Its primary role is not to define obligations, but to create a
menu of options for prosecutors.  If the menu is long enough—and it usually is—prosecu-
tors can dictate the terms of plea bargains.  When that is so, litigants . . . bargain in the
shadow of prosecutors’ preferences, budget constraints, and political trends.”).
74 See Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal
Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 293 (1975) (concluding that “more than two-thirds of the
‘marginal’ plea bargain defendants would be acquitted or dismissed were they were to
contest their cases”).
75 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50,
59–65 (1968) (suggesting that prosecutors offer the best bargains in weak cases, including
ones in which defendants may be innocent); see also James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1534–35 (1981) (explaining why prosecutors are
likely to offer “the greatest incentives to those defendants with the greatest chance for
acquittal at trial”); Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U.
PA. L. REV. 439, 451 (1971) (“According to Martin Erdman [of the New York Legal Aid
Society], New York prosecutors often reduce their sentence recommendations by at least
fifty percent if they believe that there is a fifty percent chance of a hung jury, and by a great
deal more if they believe that there is a fifty percent chance of acquittal.”).
76 The coercive nature of pleas can be illustrated by looking at the sentencing results
in cases where defendants plead guilty compared to sentences imposed on defendants con-
victed at trial.  Beverley Cook found, for example, that persons charged with violations of
the Federal Selective Service Act who were convicted at jury trials received sentences about
twice as severe as offenders who pled guilty.  Beverly Blair Cook, Sentencing Behavior of Fed-
eral Judges: Draft Cases—1972, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 597, 609 tbl.3 (1973).  Zeisel found that
the sentences of eight New York City defendants convicted at trial were 136% more severe
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dant refuse to consider any plea offer at all; many defendants, even
innocent ones, are willing to accept a lesser punishment in return for
avoiding the risk of a much harsher sentence following conviction
(even if the risk is very small).77  Thus, prosecutors can extract guilty
pleas even from defendants who are likely to be found not guilty at
trial.78  These defendants do not benefit from the plea in any genuine
sense.  This is an especially effective tactic in cases where capital pun-
ishment is a potential sentencing option.  The possibility of being sen-
tenced to death, even if it is remote, can lead defendants, even
innocent ones, to plead guilty to get the death penalty “off the
table.”79
And the theoretical mutuality of advantage is virtually non-
existent in this context.  The reality is that there is little defense coun-
sel can do to protect their clients.  To make matters worse, most
defendants are represented by under-resourced, court-appointed
counsel, often with extremely high caseloads, who have incentives to
process cases quickly and almost always via guilty pleas.80  In any case,
prosecutors have the clear and undeniable upper hand; they can over-
charge, leverage overbroad laws, exploit the information imbalance,
wear down the defendant with (often extended) pretrial incarcera-
tion, and top it off with the possibility of a draconian sentence, to
shape the bargain in such cases.81
than those proposed by prosecutors in pretrial offers to the same defendants.  Hans Zeisel,
The Offer that Cannot Be Refused, in FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & RICHARD S. FRASE, THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 558,
561 (1980).
77 See Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the
Variable Standard of Proof, 63 FLA. L. REV. 431, 450 (2011) (“When the deal is good enough,
it is rational to refuse to roll the dice, regardless of whether one believes the evidence
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether one is factually
innocent.  The risk of inaccurate results in the plea bargaining system thus seems substan-
tial.”); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 49 (1983) (“The reality of sentencing differentials is
generally enough to deprive defendants of any real choice in plea bargaining.”).
78 See Finkelstein, supra note 74. R
79 See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capi-
tal Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 63 & n.197 (1987) (noting five cases in which innocent
defendants pled guilty in order to avoid the risk of a death sentence); see also Michael Hall,
Released But Never Exonerated, a Man Fights for Freedom, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/us/released-but-not-exonerated-kerry-max-cook-fights-for-
true-freedom.html?_r=0 (describing the case of Kerry Max Cook, who pled no contest
rather than face the death penalty for a fourth trial for the same offense).
80 See John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Gideon Exceptionalism?, 122 YALE L.J.
2126, 2142–47 (2013) (detailing the pervasive problem of incompetent defense counsel
and inadequate funding for investigative and expert services for indigent defendants);
Hessick & Saujani, supra note 43, at 207–11 (discussing defense attorneys’ incentives to R
negotiate pleas).
81 See Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1066–68
(2013) (noting that mandatory minimum sentences and heavy trial penalties often pres-
sure defendants into pleading guilty no matter how good their lawyers are; the structural
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E. The Curious Case of the Alford Plea
Further evidence of the criminal justice system’s addiction to
guilty pleas (even in cases where a defendant might be innocent) can
be found in the Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina v. Alford.82
Henry Alford was charged with first-degree murder, a capital offense.
The prosecution announced its intention to seek the death penalty.
Then, the state offered Alford a deal.  If he pled guilty to second-
degree murder, he would be sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
Alford took it.83  During the plea colloquy, he insisted that he was
innocent, and that he was only pleading guilty because of the substan-
tial downside risks.84  When the case reached the Supreme Court, it
held that defendants may knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, even
while protesting their innocence, if the judge determines there is
“strong evidence of actual guilt.”85  The plea was not constitutionally
defective, even though Alford’s primary motivation for the plea was
avoiding the death penalty, because the standard for determining the
validity of guilty pleas “remains whether the plea represents a volun-
tary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
open to the defendant.”86
While the Alford plea was not officially acknowledged by the Su-
preme Court until 1970, nolo contendere pleas, also grounded in not
admitting guilt, have existed since medieval times.87  Nolo contendere
(or no contest) pleas originated from a procedure whereby a defen-
dant, hoping to avoid imprisonment, tried to end the prosecution by
offering money to the King without admitting guilt.88  Although in
practice Alford pleas and nolo contendere pleas are similar, they differ
in two respects: “First, unlike Alford pleas, nolo contendere pleas
‘avoid estoppel in later civil litigation.’  Second, defendants who plead
nolo contendere simply refuse to admit guilt, while defendants mak-
ing Alford pleas affirmatively protest their innocence.”89  The Supreme
Court determined there was no constitutional difference between the
pleas because “the Constitution is concerned with the practical conse-
challenges of fair plea bargaining far exceed the question of counsel’s performance in
individual cases).
82 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
83 Id. at 26–27.
84 Id. at 28.
85 Id. at 37.
86 Id. at 30–31.
87 Warren Moise, Sailing Between the Scilla and Charybdis: Nolo Contendere and Alford
Pleas, 17 S.C. LAWYER 10, 10 (2006) (citing F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 517 (2d ed. 1909)).
88 Id.
89 Claire L. Molesworth, Knowledge Versus Acknowledgment: Rethinking the Alford Plea in
Sexual Assault Cases, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 907, 912–13 (2008) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
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quences, not the formal categorizations, of state law.”90  As of 2003,
forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have permitted Alford
pleas.91
When one steps back a bit from the world as we currently know it,
the Alford plea is a curious legal construct.  It permits someone who
insists that he is innocent to plead guilty to a crime he does not
acknowledge committing; guilty but not guilty.  One would think that
if a defendant says he did not commit the crime, the criminal justice
system would insist on a trial to resolve the question.  Although there
is some efficiency gained by allowing Alford pleas—the primary one
being that it allows guilty defendants to plea bargain while “saving
face” with their spouses, children, parents, and/or friends92—the de-
vice provides additional incentives for factually innocent defendants
to plead, as they can receive the benefits of a guilty plea without hav-
ing to falsely admit guilt. Alford pleas, therefore, exacerbate the risk of
truly innocent defendants pleading guilty.
II
WHY DO INNOCENT DEFENDANTS PLEAD GUILTY?
In an ideal world, factually innocent defendants would not be
charged with crimes they did not commit.  In that same world, inno-
cent defendants who were wrongly charged would never plead guilty,
but would go to trial and be acquitted by a jury of their peers.  But
that is not the world we live in.  We now know, for example, due to the
availability of DNA testing, that at least twenty-nine individuals who
pled guilty to crimes they did not commit served a combined total of
more than one hundred fifty years in prison before their exonera-
tions,93 and the National Registry of Exonerations now lists 151 de-
90 Alford, 400 U.S. at 37.
91 Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure:
The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1372 & n.52 (2003).
92 Proof of this lies in the fact that Alford pleas are most commonly used in cases
involving sexual assault, violence, and white collar crime. Id. at 1376–78 (noting that most
defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges interviewed believed that Alford pleas were the
result of “feelings of shame or guilt”).
93 When the Innocent Plead Guilty, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/Content/When_the_Innocent_Plead_Guilty.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).  The
Innocence Project estimates that false confessions are involved in about 25% of wrongful
convictions that are later overturned by DNA testing. False Confessions, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php (last visited Sept.
18, 2014).  To give a few examples, John Dixon pled guilty in 1991 to a rape he did not
commit and spent ten years in prison before being exonerated by DNA evidence; Christo-
pher Ochoa pled guilty in 1989 to a murder he did not commit and spent nearly twelve
years in prison before DNA testing led to his exoneration; and Jerry Frank Townsend pled
guilty in the 1970s to six murders and one rape and served nearly twenty-two years in
prison before DNA testing led to his exoneration. See supra When the Innocent Plead Guilty.
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fendants who pled guilty and were subsequently exonerated.94  Why
do they do it?
There are three principal reasons why innocent defendants plead
guilty.  First, innocent persons charged with relatively minor offenses
often plead guilty in order to get out of jail, to avoid the hassle of
having criminal charges hanging over their heads, or to avoid being
punished for exercising their right to trial.95  Second, defendants who
were wrongfully convicted, but have their conviction vacated on direct
appeal or in post-conviction review proceedings, plead guilty to re-
ceive a sentence of time served and obtain their immediate (or at least
imminent) freedom.96  Third, some innocent defendants plead guilty
due to the fear of a harsh alternative punishment, e.g., the death
penalty.97
A. Defendants Charged With Minor or Relatively Minor
Offenses
The largest category is the first: innocent persons charged with
relatively minor offences.  Spend time talking to any “frontline” public
94 THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/ex
oneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx?View{FAF6EDDB-5A68-4F8F-8A52-2C61F5BF9EA7}&Fil
terField1=Group&FilterValue1=P# (last visited Sept. 18, 2014); see also Samuel R. Gross,
Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 173, 181 (discussing a study of 340 de-
fendants, where 6% who were exonerated pled guilty).
95 See discussion infra Part II.A.
96 We consider these reasons independently, but in reality there is an overlap between
our category 2 and category 3 cases. See discussion infra Part II.B–C.
97 There are also potential (but likely smaller) fourth- and fifth categories of cases in
which innocent defendants plead guilty, which we will not discuss in detail here.  The
fourth category consists of innocent defendants who have a prior conviction but whose
only chance of acquittal at trial is to testify in their own defense.  But, due to the very real
fear that they will be impeached with the prior conviction and the jury will—despite in-
structions to the contrary—draw a propensity inference from the prior conviction that the
defendant is guilty, the defendant might elect to plead guilty.  See John H. Blume, The
Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 488–92 (2008) (noting numerous instances of innocent de-
fendants who did not testify in their own defense because they had a prior conviction).
The fifth category consists of innocent defendants who make false confessions due to coer-
cive interrogation by the police and plead guilty, on advice of counsel, due to the difficulty
in persuading jurors that people do, in fact, confess to crimes they did not commit. See
Allison D. Redlich, False Confessions, False Guilty Pleas: Similarities and Differences, in POLICE
INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY REC-
OMMENDATIONS 49, 53 (G. Daniel Lassiter and Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010) (noting a
study of false confessors, of whom more than 10% pled guilty); see also Douglas Starr, Dept.
of Criminal Justice, The Interview: Do Police Interrogation Techniques Produce False Confessions?,
THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 9, 2013, at 42 (describing how police interrogation tactics lead to
false confessions).  False confessions are also typically contaminated with details that (sup-
posedly) only the true culprit would have known.  This kind of knowledge is very hard to
explain to a jury, particularly if police deny (as they usually do) revealing any of these facts
to the defendant. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1051, 1057–58 (2010) (finding all but two exonerees studied were induced to deliver false
confessions with surprisingly rich, detailed, and accurate information).
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defender or persons in our poorest communities, and they will tell
you that many innocent defendants charged with relatively minor
crimes plead guilty in order to get out of jail or avoid spending addi-
tional time in jail.  In many of these cases, the defendants do not have
a constitutional right to an attorney or a jury trial, and, especially if
they are incarcerated pretrial, will plead guilty just to get out of jail.98
The incentives are quite strong; most of these defendants are poor
and thus unable to afford bond, retain counsel, or care for their fami-
lies.99  Even in cases where defendants are represented, their court-
appointed lawyers will be overworked and underpaid and thus moti-
vated to resolve the case through a quick guilty plea.100  In many in-
stances, the defendant will already have some kind of criminal record,
and in the communities in which they live the stigma of a criminal
conviction, especially for a minor offense, is low.101  Even if they are
released on bail, the trial will not be for months, possibly longer, and
it is often inconvenient or expensive to go to court for things like
“roll-call.”102  And, defendants frequently know, and will be advised,
that if they reject a favorable plea and are found guilty, the judge will
punish them for exercising their right to trial.103  Thus, many defend-
ants will do whatever it takes to get out of jail or avoid a trial—includ-
ing pleading guilty to a crime they did not commit.
Erma Faye Stewart, for example, was thirty and a single mother of
two when she was arrested as part of a drug sweep based on the word
of a confidential informant.104  With no one to take care of her two
98 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
does not require counsel in misdemeanor cases where no imprisonment is at stake);
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1346–47 (2012) (describing the
pressure on defendants accused of misdemeanors to plead guilty to get out of jail).
99 Natapoff, supra note 98, at 1347 (“For those with children, jobs, or other obliga- R
tions, the deprivations inflicted by a month in jail can be worse punishment than they
would face if they were convicted at trial.”).
100 See Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1292 (2013) (describing the “meet ’em and plead ’em” system
in which defendants meet their attorney for the first time at a court hearing during which a
guilty plea is offered, accepted, and entered).
101 See Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 519, 529, 535–36 (1996) (noting that a decrease in stigma may be linked to (1) be-
ing a recidivist and/or (2) coming from a subpopulation that is more likely to be
criminal).
102 See How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, Plea Bargaining, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www
.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/
how_courts_work/pleabargaining.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (noting that plea bar-
gaining is practical to avoid the time and cost of a trial).
103 See McCoy, supra note 60, at 89–90 (describing the magnitude of the “trial penalty” R
whereby harsher sentences are imposed on a defendant who has been convicted after trial
than would have been imposed had she pled guilty); see also supra note 77 and accompany- R
ing text.
104 Erma Faye Stewart and Regina Kelly, FRONTLINE (June 17, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/four/stewart.html.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-1\CRN105.txt unknown Seq: 19 26-NOV-14 14:46
2014] THE UNEXONERATED 175
small children, Stewart decided to plead guilty to delivery of a con-
trolled substance.  She was sentenced to ten years probation and
$1800 in fines, and was required to report to her parole officer
monthly.  She was released an hour later.105  The confidential inform-
ant was later exposed as a fraud, and the charges were dropped
against the other defendants charged in the sweep, who had not pled
guilty.106  The reality is that, for many defendants like Erma Stewart, a
guilty plea often represents the only readily available key to the cell-
block door.
These defendants can be significantly harmed by their convic-
tions.107  Their criminal records can “deprive them of employment, as
well as educational and social opportunities,” and a minor conviction
can also “affect eligibility for professional licenses, child custody, food
stamps, student loans, [and] health care.”108
B. Defendants Who Prevail During the Appellate Process
Second, innocent defendants who are wrongfully convicted and
then win a new trial may plead guilty in order to secure their immedi-
ate or imminent release.109  This was true of the West Memphis Three
and, under the right circumstances, can be an appealing option to an
innocent defendant.  Why?  Think about it from the wrongfully con-
victed person’s perspective.  The defendant has been to trial and, de-
spite knowing he was innocent, the jury found him guilty.  It is not
hard to imagine that such a defendant, having seen the criminal jus-
tice system in operation, “up close and personal” so to speak, would be
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-jus
tice-system.html (describing Erma Faye Stewart’s case: “Ms. Stewart was saddled with a fel-
ony record; she was destitute, barred from food stamps and evicted from public housing”;
and as a result, had her children placed in foster care).
108 Natapoff, supra note 98, at 1316. R
109 See, e.g., supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.  It is important to note that the R
“unexonerated” defendants we describe are likely only the “tip of the iceberg” of innocent
people who plead guilty.  Most prisoners do not have the resources to retain post-
conviction counsel to conduct an investigation to prove their innocence.  There also is no
constitutional right to counsel in state or federal post-conviction proceedings. See ACLU,
SLAMMING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS: DENIAL OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND REMEDY IN AMERICA
3 (2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/HRP_UPRsubmission_annex.pdf
(“[T]he lack of a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings and procedural and sub-
stantive hurdles in raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel leave capital defend-
ants with little recourse . . . .”).  They may claim innocence but will realistically never be
able to prove it.  In these cases, the defendant will never manage to win a new trial in the
first place and so cannot challenge the original conviction in any sense.  In these cases,
innocent defendants are not only convicted of an offense they did not commit but may also
remain imprisoned or even executed.
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reluctant to “roll the dice” at a retrial.110  Even in cases where new
evidence has come to light (e.g., the DNA evidence in the case of the
West Memphis Three), the prosecution will often attempt to bargain
with the defendants in order to secure a guilty plea and maintain the
conviction.111  Most prosecutors and law enforcement officers are hos-
tile to post-conviction claims of innocence.112  This has been de-
scribed as a “conviction psychology” that leads prosecutors and police
to resist claims of innocence in order to maintain the integrity of the
criminal justice system (by not admitting that the system made a mis-
take), improve their own chances of promotion (by maintaining con-
viction rates), and avoid wasting time (as they still believe defendants
are guilty regardless of how persuasive the evidence of innocence
is).113  Even in cases where a prosecutor believes that the defendant is
(or at least may be) innocent, a guilty plea is an attractive option be-
cause it generally precludes the defendant from filing a civil suit seek-
ing money damages.114  Therefore, prosecutors will often offer highly
coercive deals involving immediate or near immediate release from
jail to secure a conviction.115
The West Memphis Three are not the only recent example of this
sad reality.  We will briefly discuss several instances where this has hap-
pened.116  Sterling Spann was convicted of the murder and sexual as-
sault of an elderly widow, Melva Neill, in 1982.  The jury sentenced
him to death.117  During the post-conviction investigation, a private
110 See supra note 77. R
111 See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. R
112 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of
Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 132–37 (2004) (analyzing the institutional and political
factors deterring prosecutors from accepting the legitimacy of post-conviction innocence
claims).
113 See id. at 135, 138–48 (discussing the reasons for “conviction psychology”).  In some
cases, the plea is extracted to prevent the defendant from bringing a civil action. See
Norman S. Oberstein, Nolo Contendere—Its Use and Effect, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 408, 409
(1964) (“[A] party to a civil action might be precluded from denying his guilt once a
judgment of conviction had been entered in any earlier criminal prosecution . . . .”).
114 See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction
Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 42–46 (2005) (discussing civil cases brought by former criminal
defendants once exonerated); Oberstein, supra note 113; see also 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2012) R
(providing that “[e]very person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress”).
115 See, e.g., supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. R
116 In two of which, in the interest of full disclosure, the Cornell Law School Capital
Punishment Clinic served as counsel of record for the defendant.
117 Andrew Dys, Convicted Killer’s Lawyers Want DNA Testing in 1981 York Co. Strangling,
ENQUIRER HERALD (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.enquirerherald.com/2012/08/20/20311
08/convicted-killers-lawyers-want.html; Keith Morrison, A 20-Year Quest for Freedom (Tran-
script), NBC NEWS (June 11, 2007, 2:02 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19161103/ns/
dateline_nbccrime_reports/t/-year-quest-freedom/#.Uij_KamgQts.
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investigator discovered that exactly sixty days before Ms. Neill was bru-
tally murdered, another elderly white woman was killed in the same
rural area pursuant to the same modus operandi (the victim was sexu-
ally assaulted, strangled, and left in the bathtub).  The same investiga-
tor discovered that exactly sixty days after the Neill murder, a third
elderly white female was sexually assaulted and strangled (there was
no bathtub but fluid was poured on the body).118  Further investiga-
tion revealed that a paranoid schizophrenic, Johnny Hullett, was con-
victed of killing the third victim.  When interviewed by members of
Spann’s defense team, Hullett insisted Spann was innocent and ac-
knowledged his own involvement in the murders.119  A leading foren-
sic pathologist, Werner Spitz, examined all three autopsy reports and
concluded that given the unique nature of the strangulation in all
three cases, the murders were committed by one person.120  Leading
criminal profilers, including Robert Ressler, a noted former FBI
profiler, also concluded that the crimes were committed by one per-
son and that Spann did not match the profile.121  Furthermore, the
fingerprint and serological evidence that led to Spann’s conviction at
trial was tainted.  Even the State’s fingerprint examiner conceded that
the prosecution’s theory of how Spann’s prints were left at the scene
was “impossible.”122  Given this new evidence of innocence, the South
Carolina Supreme Court ordered a new trial.123
Prior to the retrial, the prosecution offered to allow Spann to
enter an Alford plea making him immediately eligible for parole.  Hav-
ing spent twenty years on death row, Spann, who had been out on
bond for three years prior to the scheduled trial, decided to take the
deal.124  His sister, who had been his “rock” during the many years he
was incarcerated, had recently been killed in an automobile acci-
dent.125  And, one of his best friends on death row, Richard Johnson,
118 State v. Spann, 513 S.E.2d 98, 99 (S.C. 1999); Morrison, supra note 117.  Spann had R
been arrested and was incarcerated at the time of the third homicide. Spann, 513 S.E.2d at
99.
119 Morrison, supra note 117. R
120 Spann, 53 S.E.2d at 100; see also Honorary Review Board Member Werner Spitz, MD, AM.
INVESTIGATIVE SOC’Y OF COLD CASES, https://www.aisocc.com/werner-spitz.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 18, 2014) (noting Dr. Spitz’s professional achievements).
121 Spann, 513 S.E.2d at 100; see also Becky Sullivan, The FBI Investigator Who Coined the
Term ‘Serial Killer,’ NPR (Dec. 29, 2013, 5:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/12/29/
258160192/the-fbi-investigator-who-coined-the-term-serial-killer (noting Mr. Ressler’s pro-
fessional achievements).  Hullet, however, did match the profile given. See Morrison, supra
note 117 (describing Hullett as mentally ill with a dysfunctional family life). R
122 Morrison, supra note 117. R
123 Spann, 513 S.E.2d at 100.
124 Morrison, supra note 117. R
125 Id.
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was executed, despite Johnson’s strong claim of factual innocence.126
Devastated by his sister’s death, and frightened by Johnson’s execu-
tion, Spann decided he needed to put the matter behind him, plead
guilty, and secure his freedom.127  His attorneys, one of whom is a
coauthor of this Essay, concurred in Spann’s decision.
Edward Lee Elmore recently made a similar choice.128  Elmore
was convicted in 1982 in Greenwood County, South Carolina, of the
rape and murder of a woman for whom he worked as a yardman.129
His conviction was reversed on direct appeal,130 but he was convicted
and sentenced to death a second time.131  On appeal from that convic-
tion and death sentence, a third trial was ordered—but this time only
on the issue of punishment—and Elmore was again sentenced to
death.132  After years of appeals, he was (finally) granted a new trial by
a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
November 2011.133  Despite being one of the most, if not the most,
conservative federal courts of appeals in the United States,134 El-
more’s panel described the case as illustrating “extreme malfunctions
in the state criminal justice systems.”135  The court of appeals also de-
scribed the prosecution’s case as “underwhelming,” “flimsy,” and in-
dicative of “police ineptitude and deceit.”136
126 Id.  The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected, by a 3–2 vote, Johnson’s final
appeal, which was based on newly discovered evidence of innocence, despite the fact that
one of Johnson’s codefendants admitted that she committed the murder.  Johnson v.
Catoe, 548 S.E.2d 587, 589 (S.C. 2001).  Governor Jim Hodges then denied Johnson’s re-
quest for clemency; Hodges received 1850 letters and emails asking for clemency for
Johnson.  Jim Davenport, Hodges Denies Clemency, Trooper’s Killer to Die Today, THE POST AND
COURIER, May 3, 2002.
127 Morrison, supra note 117.  We would note that Spann is successfully employed as a R
car mechanic in Charlotte, North Carolina, and he is still happily married to the woman he
met (and married) while incarcerated on death row.
128 Raymond Bonner, When Innocence Isn’t Enough, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/03/04/opinion/sunday/when-innocence-isnt-enough.html?page
wanted=prin (discussing Mr. Elmore’s case and subsequent plea); see also Brandon L.
Garrett, The Banality of Wrongful Executions, 112 MICH. L. REV. 979, 985–88 (2014) (review-
ing the systemic failings that led to the conviction of Edward Lee Elmore). See generally
RAYMOND BONNER, ANATOMY OF INJUSTICE: A MURDER CASE GONE WRONG (2012) (describ-
ing the case of Edward Lee Elmore).
129 BONNER, ANATOMY OF INJUSTICE, supra note 128, at 8; Bonner, When Innocence Isn’t R
Enough, supra note 128. R
130 State v. Elmore, 308 S.E.2d 781, 786 (S.C. 1983).
131 BONNER, ANATOMY OF INJUSTICE, supra note 128, at 100. R
132 Id. at 108–09.
133 Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 873 (4th Cir. 2011).
134 See John H. Blume, The Dance of Death or (Almost) “No One Here Gets Out Alive”: The
Fourth Circuit’s Capital Punishment Jurisprudence, 61 S.C. L. REV. 465, 469 (2010) (noting that
while “the overall success rate of death-sentenced inmates in federal habeas corpus cases in
all circuits” is about 40%, in the Fourth Circuit it is about 6.2%).
135 Elmore, 661 F.3d at 786 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136 Id. at 871.
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Following the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the prosecution offered
Elmore a deal: he could plead guilty pursuant to Alford in exchange
for time served and immediate release.  With the alternative being a
year or more in jail prior to a retrial and then having to face a fourth
jury, Elmore, with some reluctance, accepted the plea offer and
walked out of a maximum-security prison several days later.137  In this
case too, his lawyers agreed with his decision.138  Public reaction to the
plea was mixed, with most agreeing that the plea was unfair.  The New
York Times, for example, published an editorial entitled, “When Inno-
cence Is Not Enough.”139  Elmore, who is happy to no longer be incar-
cerated, spent more than thirty years in prison for a crime he did not
commit, and has not been, and will never be, truly “exonerated.”140
137 Jeffrey Collins & Meg Kinnard, Ex-Death Row Inmate Walks Out a Free Man, THE
STATE (Mar. 3, 2012), http://www.thestate.com/2012/03/03/2175467/ex-death-row-in
mate-walks-out.html.
138 Emanuella Grinberg, Death Row Lawyer: ‘If I Throw in the Towel, a Client Dies,’
CNN (Mar. 7, 2014, 4:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/07/us/death-row-stories-
elmore/.
139 Bonner, When Innocence Isn’t Enough, supra note 128. R
140 A “new” member has recently joined the unexonerated in this category of cases.
George Souliotes spent nearly seventeen years in prison after being found guilty of a triple
murder for allegedly starting a fire that killed three people.  A federal court granted the
writ of habeas corpus and vacated his conviction, finding that the arson evidence was scien-
tifically flawed and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately challenge it.  Sou-
liotes v. Grounds, 2013 WL 875952, at *57 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2013).  The prosecution then
offered Souliotes a deal: he would be immediately released if he pled no contest to three
counts of involuntary manslaughter for failure to maintain working smoke detectors (even
though the house did have a smoke alarm).  What is most striking is that the prosecution
conceded there was no evidence that the fire had been started deliberately.  In other
words, there was no evidence that the “crime” Souliotes pled guilty to was—in fact—a
crime.  Nevertheless, Souliotes agreed to the “deal” and the trial judge accepted it.  Maura
Dolan, Out of Prison and into the Unknown, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.latimes
.com/local/la-me-c1-freed-prison-20131017-dto-htmlstory.html.  Souliotes apparently
“hoped the state would acknowledge he had been wrongfully convicted and compensate
him for his confinement, but the plea ended any such possibility.” Id.
Other examples of defendants who have prevailed during the appellate process and
then pled guilty include Kerry Max Cook and Sunny Jacobs.  Cook’s case is particularly
interesting as Cook has now been conclusively proven innocent.  Cook was charged with,
convicted of, and sentenced to death for the brutal murder and rape of Linda Jo Edwards
in Texas.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that some of the witness’s testimony
was prejudicial and that police misconduct had occurred, and granted a new trial.  After
Cook was granted a new trial, the prosecution offered an Alford plea in exchange for a
sentence of time served.  Cook accepted.  Subsequently, DNA testing conclusively estab-
lished Cook’s innocence.  Thus Cook was able to transition from the unexonerated to the
exonerated. Kerry Max Cook, FRONTLINE (June 17, 2004), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/plea/four/cook.html.  Sunny Jacobs was convicted and sentenced
to death for the 1976 murders of two law enforcement officers in Florida; a third codefend-
ant received a life sentence after pleading guilty and testifying against her and her partner.
Following the discovery that the chief prosecution witness had given contradictory state-
ments, the prosecutor proposed an Alford plea, which Jacobs accepted.  She was released in
1992.  Rob Warden, Sonia Jacobs, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC, CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVIC-
TIONS, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/legalclinic/
wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/fl/sonia-jacobs.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
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C. Avoiding Harsh Alternative Punishments
Finally, factually innocent defendants may plead guilty because
they are afraid that they will be punished (often quite severely) for
exercising their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  In capital mur-
der cases, for example, the prosecution will threaten the defendant
with capital punishment if he does not plead guilty.141  After being
notified that the prosecution was seeking the death penalty against
them, Phillip Bivens and Bobby Ray Dixon pled guilty to a 1979 Missis-
sippi rape and murder in exchange for a sentence of life imprison-
ment.  In 2010, DNA testing conclusively established their
innocence.142  This was also a factor in the West Memphis Three case;
the fact that Damien Echols was on death row contributed to the deci-
sions of the three men to plead guilty.143  But even where death is not
a sentencing option, prosecutors often have other potential harsh
sentences, including lengthy terms of imprisonment and life without
parole, as well as enhancements for second- or third-time offenders
that can be used to induce reluctant defendants, even innocent ones,
to plead guilty in exchange for a reduction in the amount of time that
will have to be served.144
III
REDUCING THE NUMBER OF THE UNEXONERATED?
There is clearly a problem; in a fair criminal justice system inno-
cent defendants would not plead guilty to crimes they did not commit.
141 See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 79; James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, R
100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2097 & n.165 (2000) (“[A capital charge] provides the best plea-
bargaining leverage imaginable . . . .”).
142 Bobby Ray Dixon, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.u
mich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3179 (last visited Sept. 18,
2014).
143 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. R
144 See, e.g., James Ochoa, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Con
tent/James_Ochoa.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (describing the case of James Ochoa
who pled guilty to a 2005 carjacking he did not commit to avoid a possible sentence of
twenty-five years to life if convicted at trial; ten months after his conviction, DNA testing
proved his innocence).
Another former Cornell Law School Capital Punishment Clinic client, Johnny Ringo
Pearson, was charged with murder and related offenses.  After nearly a decade of pretrial
litigation revolving around Pearson’s competency to stand trial, he was found to be a per-
son with mental retardation and thus not eligible for the death penalty pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  But, he was still facing
a potential sentence of life imprisonment.  The prosecution offered a plea bargain pursu-
ant to which Pearson would be released after a relatively short additional term of imprison-
ment.  Given the alternatives, Pearson was willing to accept the bargain despite strong
evidence of factual innocence.  Ian McGullam, Generations of Capital Punishment Clinic Stu-
dents Fight for Johnny Ringo Pearson, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCHOOL (Oct. 16, 2013), http://
www.lawschool.cornell.edu/spotlights/Generations-of-Capital-Punishment-Clinic-Students-
Fight-for-Johnny-Ringo-Pearson.cfm (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
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But they do.  We are not exactly sure how often it occurs, but the
numbers are not so small that the phenomena can be dismissed as
artifact.  On the other hand, it is possible that innocent defendants
pleading guilty is simply the cost of doing plea business.  In the South
there is an old saying: “People like sausage and justice, but no one
likes to see how either one is really made.”  Maybe that is true in the
plea bargaining context.  If the system must induce virtually all de-
fendants, somehow and someway, to plead guilty, then not only the
guilty but also the innocent will in some instances agree to plead
guilty.  And no feasible solutions come readily to mind.  This seems
especially true for the persons charged with relatively minor offenses
who plead guilty for time served to get out of jail.  But we are not quite
ready to throw up our hands and give up.  So, let us discuss some
possibilities.
First, the criminal justice system could eliminate plea bargaining.
While this is viewed by many people, including members of the cur-
rent Supreme Court,145 as unthinkable, some European criminal jus-
tice systems do not allow the practice.146  In a world without the ability
to plea bargain, we would expect to see two adjustments benefitting
innocent (and also guilty) defendants.  First, charges would be dis-
missed in more cases.  Without the ability to use many of the currently
sanctioned highly coercive practices, prosecutors would dismiss weak
cases rather than working to get the “best” deal possible.  And since,
on average, weak cases are more closely associated with innocence,147
innocent defendants would benefit from a no-bargaining regime.  Sec-
ond, charging decisions would likely become more rational.  In to-
day’s plea-driven market, prosecutors have incentives to overcharge in
order to start the “bidding” so to speak.148  Without the ability to bar-
gain, however, prosecutors would be forced to charge more appropri-
ately, at least in regard to the expected disposition of cases.  Another
benefit that would protect the innocent would be that the prosecutors
would not be able to freely “purchase” the testimony of jailhouse in-
formants by offering them a dismissal or reduction in charges or sen-
145 See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text; see also supra note 64. R
146 See Stephan C. Thaman, A Typology of Consensual Criminal Procedures: An Historical
and Comparative Perspective on the Theory and Practice of Avoiding the Full Criminal Trial, in
WORLD PLEA BARGAINING: CONSENSUAL PROCEDURES AND THE AVOIDANCE OF THE FULL CRIMI-
NAL TRIAL 344, 363–64 (Stephen C. Thaman ed., 2010) (noting that in the United King-
dom, “the existence of bargaining is generally denied” and that “[t]here, one allegedly
pleads guilty only in expectation of a mitigated sentence” guaranteed by the judge).
147 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. R
148 See Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 150, 154 (2012) (noting that the current charging system is akin to “sticker price”
on a new car—it is not intended to be the sale price, and only a fool would pay it).
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tence in exchange, thus eliminating a leading cause of wrongful
convictions.149
One of the authors of this Essay has, over the years, undergone a
metamorphosis in thinking about the morality and utility of plea bar-
gaining.  During his years as a full-time practicing criminal defense
lawyer, he fully embraced the conventional wisdom that pleas were
essential.  He could see the limitations of the “mutuality of advantage”
rationale, but living inside the system prevented him from thinking
outside of it.  He now believes there is much to be said for jettisoning
the plea-driven system.  It places the enforcement of the criminal law
in the hands of prosecutors and defense lawyers, does not make legis-
lators accountable for their legislation (and thus promotes political
posturing with draconian legislation), and has a corrosive effect on
the attorney-client relationship.150  However, without modifications to
current minimum/maximum punishment and sentencing regimes,
which are, at least for the moment, not viable, a non–plea bargaining
world is not the solution, especially given that most of the rest of the
world, again at least for now, is not prepared to eliminate the
practice.151
149 See NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVIC-
TIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNO-
CENT AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3 (2005), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/
docs/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf (describing informant testimony, often from jailhouse in-
formants, as the “leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases”); see also
Alexandra Natapoff, Comment, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convic-
tions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107, 108–11 (2006) (presenting data on “snitch-gener-
ated wrongful convictions”).
150 Because most defendants are indigent, they are represented by public defenders or
court–appointed counsel.  Most of these attorneys have large caseloads and incentives to
dispose of cases as quickly as possible with as little time spent on each case as possible.
Thus the first conversation that many defendants have with their attorneys focuses on a
plea, i.e., what can the client “live with.” See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMIT-
TEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s Continu-
ing Quest for Equal Justice 16 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_coun
sel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheck dam.pdf; supra note 100 and accompanying text. R
This, understandably, leaves many defendants with the impression that their attorney:
(a) does not care whether they are innocent or guilty or whether their rights were violated,
and (b) does not intend to conduct a factual investigation.
151 In fact, if anything, the Supreme Court has “constitutionalized” the status quo.
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (“[T]he Court today opens a whole new field of
constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  For
example, in three cases over the last several years the Court has found trial counsel ineffec-
tive for deficient performance in plea bargaining.  In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court held
that it was deficient performance to give the client erroneous advice regarding the immi-
gration consequences arising from a guilty plea. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).  In Lafler, the
Court found counsel’s performance deficient based on erroneous advice that resulted in
the defendant rejecting a favorable plea in favor of going to trial (at which he was con-
victed and received a substantially more severe sentence).  132 S. Ct. at 1390–91.  In doing
so, the Court stated that “the right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be defined or
enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining plays in securing
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A similar, but more limited, possibility would be not to allow
Alford pleas.  It is, as we have previously noted, an odd thing that we
allow defendants to plead guilty to crimes they insist they did not com-
mit.  A rational criminal justice system, in our view, would respond to
a denial of guilt with something resembling the following: “Okay, if
you say you did not do it, we have a procedure for determining
whether the evidence is sufficient to convict; it is called a trial.”  Doing
away with Alford pleas would have the effect of forcing some innocent
defendants to go to trial, where they would (hopefully) be acquitted.
And, in other cases, prosecutors would likely dismiss the charges in-
stead of using the Alford plea to seal the deal.  On the other hand,
Alford pleas do have practical value.  They allow some guilty defend-
ants to plead who would not otherwise do so to “save face,” especially
in cases involving sexual assaults (although that is a strange reason to
embrace the practice), and guilty-but-not-guilty pleas also permit
some potentially innocent defendants who would be convicted at trial
to obtain a better outcome (which is the equivalent of saying that a
little less injustice beats more injustice).152  The most significant ob-
jection to this proposal, however, is that as long as plea bargaining in
general is still available in the non-Alford context, the most likely result
of eliminating the practice would be to simply drive cases now re-
solved by Alford pleas “underground” into the available plea bargain-
ing market.
Third, the criminal justice system could (and definitely should)
require more judicial supervision of the plea bargaining process.  At
one end of the spectrum, judges could be authorized to strike the
death penalty as a potential punishment if the court thought it was
being used only for, or primarily for, “plea extraction” purposes.  But,
this is likely to do little good.  Even with a judge acting in good
faith,153 it is difficult to overcome the information-gap problem.  How
is a judge to know if the prosecutor is acting coercively or vindictively,
except in the most egregious cases?154  One possibility would be to
convictions and determining sentences.” Id. at 1388.  And, in Missouri v. Frye, the Court
held that counsel could be found ineffective for failing to inform the defendant of a plea
offer that lapsed.  The defendant later pled guilty, but in exchange for substantially less
favorable terms.  132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012).
152 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. R
153 We would also note the problem of judicial hostility to criminal defendants gener-
ally, especially in jurisdictions where judges are elected. See, e.g., Eric Sandberg-Zakian,
Rethinking “Bias”: Judicial Elections and the Due Process Clause after Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 64 ARK. L. REV. 179, 199–200 (2011) (“In Pennsylvania, elected trial court judges
sentence criminal defendants to longer and longer prison sentences as an impending elec-
tion gets closer and closer.”).
154 Another proposal we considered but ultimately opted not to advance was (substan-
tially) more rigorous enforcement of rule 3.8 of the American Bar Association Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, which states: “The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain
from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.”
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-1\CRN105.txt unknown Seq: 28 26-NOV-14 14:46
184 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:157
adopt the model suggested by Justice Powell in his Hayes dissent,
where he stated: “[T]he question to be asked . . . is whether the prose-
cutor reasonably might have charged respondent under [the harsher
Act] in the first place.”155  However, unfortunately, even this may be
unrealistic as judges are busy and dockets are crowded; in large urban
areas the system is driven by the rule of “meat in/sausage out.”
Another needed reform in the area of judicial supervision of plea
bargaining is to allow trial and appellate courts to consider the “volun-
tariness” of the plea.  Current legal doctrine focuses myopically on
whether the plea was knowing and intelligent.156  This, in turn, fo-
cuses on questions like: Was the defendant aware of the rights he was
waiving by entering the plea (the right to jury trial, the right to testify,
the right to confront witnesses)?157 Was the defendant aware of the
nature of the charges he was pleading guilty to?158 Was the defendant
aware of the maximum punishment?159 And, was there a factual basis
for the plea?160  But very little attention is given to whether the plea
was truly voluntary.  For example, the pleas entered by the West Mem-
phis Three easily satisfied the knowing-and-intelligent inquiry.  But
that was not what was wrong with the pleas they were offered.  The
problem was that virtually no rational defendant, even an innocent
one, would turn the deal down.  Thus courts should recognize, and
more importantly enforce, a stricter voluntary guilty plea require-
ment.  The requirement would be somewhat akin to a voluntariness
challenge to an incriminating statement.  Current confession law doc-
trine uses a totality of the circumstances test and asks courts to inquire
whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the individual’s
will was overborne by coercive interrogation practices.161  The same
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2008).  As our discussion of the West Memphis
Three and George Souliotes cases illustrated, this rule is “honored in the breach.”  In the-
ory, more vigorous enforcement of the rule would prevent some of the extremely coercive
plea bargains offered in very weak cases.  This would be particularly relevant to cases
classed in our second category (defendants who prevail during the appellate process).
However, as our colleague Brad Wendel pointed out, there is also the danger that any
significant increase in disciplining prosecutors carries the significant risk of making the
situation worse, not better.  This is true for two reasons.  First, it encourages prosecutors to
misrepresent the strength of cases to ensure the facial existence of probable cause.  The
second and more important reason is that it would discourage prosecutors from offering
plea bargains to these defendants at all.
155 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 370 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
156 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. R
157 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(F).
158 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(G).
159 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(H)–(J).
160 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
161 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 176 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The
requirement that a confession be voluntary reflects a recognition of the importance of free
will and of reliability in determining the admissibility of a confession, and thus demands an
inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession.”).
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could be done for guilty pleas; the test would be whether, considering
the totality of the circumstances, the individual’s will was overborne by
a coercive plea bargain.  While this would be a step forward, it is not
without significant downsides.  First, unless a court has the power not
only to set aside the plea but also to dismiss the charges, then defend-
ants like Spann and Elmore benefit little from being returned to the
status quo ante.  Second, totality of the circumstances tests very rarely
work to a criminal defendant’s benefit.  In the confession context, for
example, although voluntariness challenges are many, successful ones
are very, very few.162
In a somewhat similar vein, rules prohibiting the withdrawal of
guilty pleas could be relaxed.  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, which is representative of the procedure used in most
jurisdictions, states that: “After the court imposes sentence, the defen-
dant may not withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and the
plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or collateral attack.”163
But even on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings an assertion of
innocence standing alone—even a well-supported one—is not a basis
to withdraw a plea.164  However, if these rules were changed (e.g., the
time limits were relaxed and the basis for withdrawal expanded), this
would allow “unexonerated” defendants the opportunity to prove
their innocence, even after pleading guilty.165  Resistance to such a
proposal would be high, however, because guilty as well as innocent
defendants would seek to withdraw their pleas and, given the very
strong systemic commitment to finality and the criminal justice sys-
tem’s addiction to guilty pleas, any significant modification to the
rules that puts more pleas “at risk” is a difficult sell.
Fourth, the current law in most jurisdictions, barring a defendant
from bringing a civil action if he pleads guilty, could be modified.166
162 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) (plurality opinion) (stating that it
takes “unusual stamina” to maintain a statement is involuntary if authorities have adhered
to Miranda dictates and that “litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a
valid waiver”).
163 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e).
164 See Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1090–91 (2011)
(“Under the Supreme Court’s existing jurisprudence, actual innocence alone is not
enough to reverse a wrongful conviction . . . .”).
165 Another possibility would be to disallow waivers of post-conviction claims of inno-
cence where a defendant has pled guilty.  This would prevent the situation in which an
innocent defendant pleads guilty and is then prevented by the express terms of the plea
agreement from asserting a post-conviction claim based on innocence.
166 For example, Ohio law states that to bring a wrongful imprisonment civil action
against the State, an applicant must be an individual who was “found guilty of, but did not
plead guilty to, the particular charge or a lesser-included offense,” and Iowa law states that
to bring a wrongful imprisonment civil action an individual must not have pled guilty to
“the public offense charged, or to any lesser included offense.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2743.48 (LexisNexis 2013); IOWA CODE § 663A.1 (2013).
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Allowing civil suits even if a defendant pleads guilty would discourage
the practice of forcing innocent defendants to plead guilty, or in some
cases, would allow the individual to recoup some damages for the loss
of liberty.  If the defendant prevailed in such a suit, it would also serve
to restore a person’s civil rights.  However, the potential objections
are many.  Guilty as well as innocent defendants would sue.  While in
many cases, courts could quickly separate the “wheat from the chaff,”
the nuisance suit factor makes this effectively a nonstarter.
Fifth, in our second category of cases, where innocent defendants
who are wrongfully convicted and then win a new trial plead guilty in
order to secure their immediate or imminent release, a different pros-
ecutor’s office could be assigned to the case after the appellate rever-
sal.  The new prosecutorial team, which in theory would not be as
invested in again securing a conviction, would decide whether to dis-
miss the case, offer a plea, or go forward with the prosecution.167  This
might help to reduce the effect of institutional and political factors
that prevent prosecutors from accepting the legitimacy of post-convic-
tion innocence claims168 and therefore encourage weak cases to be
dismissed rather than settled through plea bargaining.  However,
again we are skeptical.  Prosecutors are a “tight-knit group,”169 and
will be reluctant to earn the ire of their current or former
prosecutorial colleagues (or law enforcement officers) by dismissing
the charges.
As our penultimate suggestion, we offer a more detailed proposal
that—to our knowledge—has not previously been suggested in the
literature.  That is the use of citizen panels to review guilty pleas after
the fact in cases where defendants allege they pled guilty to a crime
they did not commit.  If this procedure were adopted, defendants who
plead guilty pretrial in exchange for time served (or some nominal
additional punishment) would, upon request, have their claim of in-
nocence reviewed by a citizen review panel.170  This would allow de-
fendants to take the benefit of the guilty plea (which, as we have
described above, they will often be forced to do), while still providing
a forum for them to make the case that they were in fact innocent and
explain why they pled guilty to a crime they did not commit.
167 A different judge should also be assigned to the case.
168 See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. R
169 See, e.g., Steven Andersen, Foul Play: After Ted Stevens Debacle, DOJ Sends Prosecutors a
Sharp Message, INSIDE COUNSEL (June 1, 2009), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2009/06/
01/foul-play-after-ted-stevens-debacle-doj-sends-pros (“Prosecutors are a tight-knit group,
even after they go over to the other side.”).
170 A possible variation of this would be review by a panel of retired judges.  But for
reasons that follow, we prefer to utilize private citizens.
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Citizen review panels and boards are already used in the United
States in two main areas: allegations of police misconduct171 and in-
surance of child welfare.172  These are independent boards comprised
of civilians, and while not courts, they do hear cases, make objective
determinations, and have the authority to make recommendations.
For example, police review boards usually hear allegations of police
misconduct made by the public and recommend sanctions for officer
misconduct to the chief of police, mayor, and/or city council, who
can then implement the sanctions.173  Boards often have the power to
subpoena people, documents, and other evidence.174  Different re-
view boards have different procedures by which members are ap-
pointed to the boards; for example, some boards are appointed by
officials175 and other boards appoint members from public
volunteers.176
In the case of review of guilty pleas of persons alleging inno-
cence, one easy-to-implement option would be to select a panel of citi-
zens from those called for jury service.  Potential jurors are usually
selected at random from lists of those who are registered to vote and/
or have a driver’s license.177  Most potential jurors are not actually
selected to serve on a jury, perhaps because most criminal cases plead
171 For example, such boards have been set up in Atlanta, Las Vegas, Pittsburgh, and
San Diego. ATLANTA CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD, http://acrbgov.org/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2014); LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD, https://www
.citizenreviewboard.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2014); CITIZEN POLICE REVIEW BOARD PITTS-
BURGH, http://cprbpgh.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2014); CITIZEN’S REVIEW BOARD ON PO-
LICE PRACTICES, http://www.sandiego.gov/citizensreviewboard/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2014).
172 For example, such boards have been set up in New Mexico and Oregon. NEW
MEXICO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD, http://www.nmcrb.org/ (last
visited Sept. 18, 2014); Citizen Review Board, OREGON JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, http://courts.
oregon.gov/OJD/OSCA/cpsd/citizenreview/index.page (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
173 See ATLANTA CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD, http://www.atlantaga.gov/index.aspx?
page=544 (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (“The Board shall advise the Mayor, the President of
Council, Council members and the Chief of Police and the Chief of Corrections with the
purpose of improving the ability of police personnel to carry out their duties . . . .”).
174 See, e.g., Judge Wettick Orders Chief Harper to Respond to G-20 Documents Subpoena, CITI-
ZEN POLICE REVIEW BOARD PITTSBURGH (June 18, 2010), http://cprbpgh.org/1564 (discuss-
ing the CPRBP’s subpoena of the Pittsburgh Police Chief).
175 For example, the Atlanta Citizen Review Board is made up of members appointed
by various constituencies. About Us, ATLANTA CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD, http://acrbgov.org/
about-us/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2014).
176 LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT CITIZEN REVIEW BOARD, supra note
171. R
177 See About Jury Service, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Federal
Courts/JuryService/about-jury-service.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (“Potential jurors
are chosen from a jury pool generated by random selection of citizens’ names from lists of
registered voters, or combined lists of voters and people with drivers licenses, in the judi-
cial district.”).
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and most civil cases settle.178  Instead of having these members of the
public effectively sit around and wait to be selected for a jury (i.e., do
nothing), some could serve on a “plea review board.”
Review would not be tantamount to a full trial and would and
should not be overly formalistic given that most defendants will not be
able to afford counsel.  Instead, upon a defendant’s request, the panel
would be presented with summary materials about the case (i.e., the
arrest warrants and indictment(s)/information, the sentencing range
for the alleged crimes charged, the sentencing range for the crime(s)
to which the defendant pled, the sentence imposed, and how long the
defendant was incarcerated prior to the plea) and an explanation
from the defendant as to why she pled guilty to a crime she did not
commit.  The panel would then determine whether the totality of the
circumstances suggests substantial doubt as to the accuracy of the
guilty plea.  In cases involving pleas to misdemeanors, the review
panel could be given the power to set aside a conviction and function-
ally acquit the defendant if it concluded that there was substantial
doubt as to the accuracy of the plea.  In felony cases (where there is
likely to be more resistance to acquittal by a panel), a finding of sub-
stantial doubt could qualify the defendant for a post-conviction relief
proceeding (and the appointment of counsel) on the grounds that it
is likely she pled guilty to a crime she did not commit.179  The case
would then go before a judge to determine whether there was enough
evidence to support the guilty verdict.
In many cases the evidence might show that the defendant was
guilty—for example, in cases where the prosecution has strong evi-
dence against a defendant or where the defendant has no convincing
explanation as to why she entered a guilty plea.  However, in other
cases defendants might be able to make the requisite showing.  Re-
gardless, the guilty plea panel procedure we are proposing would pro-
vide some opportunity to have convictions set aside for
“unexonerated” persons without putting significant pressure on crimi-
nal justice infrastructure.
Thus, defendants who decided to plead guilty rather than go to
trial would still have some opportunity to have their guilt or inno-
178 See How Courts Work: Steps in a Trial, Settling Cases, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_
courts_work/cases_settling.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (noting that most civil cases
resolve in settlement); supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Jury Statistics: R
Court Year: 2012, JUDICIAL BRANCH STATISTICS, available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/statistics/
jury/Jury_12.pdf (showing that in the Connecticut Superior Court in 2012, 537,041 sum-
monses were issued, 92,851 jurors served, and 6,154 jurors were selected for trial).
179 This is currently not a ground for post-conviction relief in any jurisdiction we are
aware of, although some states do have a general “in the interests of justice” category of
post-conviction claims—for example, South Carolina.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(A)(4)
(2013).
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cence decided by a panel of their peers.  While historically citizen in-
volvement in the criminal justice system was provided by jury trials,180
we no longer have a system of jury trials.  As the Supreme Court re-
cently stated, we have a system of pleas.181  But the core function that
jurors play—providing an accused “an inestimable safeguard against
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, bi-
ased, or eccentric judge”182—is equally important in the current
“need to plead” system.183  The ability to have a citizen plea review
panel would extend the historical protection provided by juries to all
defendants, not just the 3% who go to trial.184  This is especially criti-
cal in the current regime as innocent defendants who plead guilty are
often those who are most vulnerable to overzealous prosecutors.185
We acknowledge that there may be difficulties with our proposal
because some potential jurors selected to participate on a guilty plea
180 The Supreme Court has stated that juries “guard against a spirit of oppression and
tyranny on the part of rulers,” essentially acting as an intermediary between the State and
criminal defendants.  United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995) (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. R
182 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); see also Richard L. Lippke, Plea
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Constitution, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 709, 714 (2013) (“Jury trials
were viewed [by the founders] as serving important public values, in ensuring the integrity
of charge adjudication procedures against suspicions of corruption or tyranny, and in edu-
cating the public by bringing them into contact with more learned judges and involving
them in debates about public affairs.”).
183 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 915–16 (2006) (noting that in the current system plea bargaining subverts rights
to public information and participation in criminal trials and describing plea bargaining as
a “low-visibility procedure[ ] run by insiders”).
184 In her excellent article, The Plea Jury, Professor Laura Appleman proposes the use
of a “plea jury” that would be impaneled to sit alongside the judge in deciding whether to
accept a guilty plea.  Under Appleman’s proposal, the jury would assess three things:
whether the factual basis admitted by the defendant fits the alleged crimes; whether the
plea was knowing and voluntary; and, whether the proposed sentence is appropriate.
Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 748 (2010).  We have no fundamental
quarrel with this suggestion, but we believe our proposal to be more pragmatic and effec-
tive, especially in cases in our first and the largest category (defendants charged with minor
or relatively minor offences).  It is not feasible to impanel a jury in such cases given the
current criminal justice infrastructure.  Furthermore, the questions put to the jury in
Appleman’s proposal do not necessarily speak to the systemic pressures that lead to inno-
cent defendants pleading guilty.  For example, there is no consideration of the strength of
the underlying evidence and no consideration beyond the current “knowing and volun-
tary” standard of reasons why the defendant may be pleading guilty to something they did
not do.  Additionally, if the plea jury does not accept the plea, then the defendant is per-
mitted to withdraw the plea and go to trial, a different plea could be agreed to, or the plea
jury could recommend a different sentence. Id. at 749.  In many cases, this would not
actually help an innocent defendant who wanted or needed to be released from custody as
soon as possible.
185 Establishing review by a guilty plea panel would provide some oversight of prosecu-
tors’ plea bargaining behavior and would hopefully discourage the current widespread
practice of threatening excessive punishments in order to pressure defendants into plead-
ing guilty.
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review panel may take the “intuitive” approach that someone who
pleads guilty probably is guilty (the “I would never plead guilty to
something I did not do” mentality).  However, this could be remedied
by providing the panel with some basic information about “unexoner-
ated” defendants.  A more fundamental problem may be that, without
access to counsel or resources, the procedure may be of limited value
for many persons who plead guilty.  On the other hand, keeping the
process simple and not overly “legalistic” would encourage participa-
tion even by unrepresented defendants.  We understand that it is not
a perfect proposal, but it would provide some access to justice for in-
nocent defendants who plead guilty and would also provide much-
needed citizen involvement in the criminal justice system.
Finally, we could attempt to truly level the criminal justice playing
field by: (a) adequately funding indigent defense systems;186 (b) in-
creasing the quality of appointed defense counsel;187 (c) mandating
true open-file policies by prosecutors;188 (d) not allowing jailhouse in-
formants to testify;189 and (e) improving the accuracy of forensic evi-
dence (as suggested by the National Research Council).190  But, in the
final analysis, this is probably the most unrealistic of all the proposals
we have discussed.
CONCLUSION
The case of the West Memphis Three may be unique in the
amount of public scrutiny it obtained, but it represents only the tip of
186 See Blume & Johnson, supra note 80, at 2137 (“[T]he right to counsel is only as R
strong as the underlying commitment to the quality of representation provided by attor-
neys for indigent defendants.”).
187 See id.; see also Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 2013 WL 6275319, at *2–5 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 4, 2013), (finding that the public defense systems in Mount Vernon and Bur-
lington, Washington, deprived those faced with misdemeanor charges of the right to assis-
tance of counsel, in what had become a “meet and plead” system).
188 See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of
Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257,
306–09 (2008) (highlighting the importance of disclosing exculpatory information and
evidence).
189 See supra note 149. R
190 COMMITTEE ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMUNITY, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FOR-
WARD 99–101 (2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf
(“[T]he least that the courts should insist upon from any forensic discipline is certainty
that practitioners in the field adhere to enforceable standards, ensuring that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”). See generally
Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86
N.C. L. REV. 163 (2007) (documenting failures of crime labs and forensic techniques
across the United States and arguing for increased regulation of forensic evidence).  One
way to ameliorate the effect of inaccurate forensic science is to allow defendants to chal-
lenge their convictions and seek new trials when outdated and/or unreliable forensic sci-
ence was used to convict them (even where they have previously confessed or accepted a
plea).  Such a law has recently been introduced in Texas.  S.B. 344, 83d Leg. (Tex. 2013).
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the iceberg of “unexonerated” defendants.  As we noted above, Justice
Kennedy recently observed that “the reality [is] that criminal justice
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”191
The current criminal justice system (this “system of pleas”) offers
neither effective safeguards to protect defendants against overzealous
prosecution nor effective oversight of prosecutorial conduct.  Vulnera-
ble defendants are left at the mercy of prosecutors and defense law-
yers, who not only need to deal with cases quickly to clear their heavy
workloads but also often have professional incentives to resolve cases
quickly.192  In this system, the protections afforded by trial by jury—
said to be “fundamental to the American scheme of justice”193—are
lost; legal regulation is almost nonexistent; and, as William Stuntz
stated, “[l]aw’s shadow disappears,” leaving a system where a defen-
dant’s fate is dependent on “prosecutors’ preferences, budget con-
straints, and political trends.”194  In this system, innocent people
plead guilty to crimes they did not commit, and join the “unexoner-
ated,” often with severe, life-altering (and sometimes life-ending)
consequences.
We have made several suggestions to reduce the number of the
“unexonerated” and to infuse additional judicial oversight and citizen
participation into the criminal justice system.  Our most original sug-
gestion is to use citizen review panels made up of jury members to
review guilty pleas and ensure that there is not “substantial doubt” as
to the accuracy of a plea.  If developed and implemented, this could
provide some opportunity to have convictions set aside for “unexoner-
ated” persons and, without putting significant pressure on criminal
justice infrastructure, preserve the fundamental principle that “the
truth of every accusation . . . should afterwards be confirmed by the
unanimous suffrage of . . . equals and neighbours, indifferently cho-
sen and superior to all suspicion.”195  We recognize the practical diffi-
culty in any proposed reform of the current plea bargaining process
and the substantial debate that has already taken place as to reform of
the system, but, at a minimum, we hope to stimulate debate and dis-
cussion of the plight of the “unexonerated.”
191 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
192 See supra notes 100, 112 and accompanying text. R
193 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
194 Stuntz, supra note 60, at 2548. R
195 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151–52 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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